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In her 2012 Descartes Lectures at Tilburg University, Cristina Bicchieri 
addressed three questions that have been central in her research for the 
last twenty years: What are social norms? How can they be measured? 
And how can we change them? The monograph under review is a 
descendant of those lectures. Conceived originally as a standard 
academic volume—with commentaries and replies—the nature of the 
book changed significantly during its gestation. Since 2010 Bicchieri had 
been involved in a project aimed at training social workers. The project, 
led by UNICEF in collaboration with various NGOs, aimed at tackling 
practices such as breastfeeding prohibitions, female genital mutilation, 
child marriage, and open defecation—which all had proven to be 
remarkably resistant to traditional policy interventions. Thanks to this 
project, Bicchieri had the chance to do what philosophers rarely do, 
namely, to make her theory practically relevant. 
Rather than a classic academic book of philosophy and social 
science, Norms in the wild is a partly theoretical, partly practical manual 
for policy-makers and social workers interested in changing people’s 
behaviour through the manipulation of norms. The book is organised in 
five chapters: “Diagnosing norms”, “Measuring norms”, “Norm change”, 
“Tools for change”, and “Trendsetters”. The style is direct and simple, 
with frequent repetitions and summaries (‘take-home messages’) at the 
end of sections, to facilitate comprehension and recollection. Footnotes 
are kept to a minimum, the bibliography is essential, and—
importantly—Bicchieri never engages in conceptual or empirical 
disputes with alternative theoretical frameworks or interpretations of 
the evidence. Her task here is not to convince researchers, but 
practitioners and, presumably, politicians. 
If you are unfamiliar with Bicchieri’s earlier work and with related 
research on social norms, this is a good point to start. The monograph is 
well-organized, clear, delivers complex ideas in the simplest manner, 
NORMS IN THE WILD / BOOK REVIEW 
VOLUME 10, ISSUE 1, SPRING 2017 102 
and offers an overview of how these ideas can be applied to concrete 
problems. Norms in the wild is not theoretically innocent, to be sure. But 
new ideas are not highlighted as such, nor are they discussed in the 
context of recent research. As a consequence, a sophisticated reader 
must do most of the work of reconstructing the existing debate herself, 
as well as placing the development of Bicchieri’s theory in its context. 
 
I. WHAT ARE NORMS? 
Bicchieri has tried to give an answer to this question for more than two 
decades. The key elements can be found already in Rationality and 
coordination (1993), and have been developed in later work with slight 
modifications. So, a curious reader will want to know whether Norms in 
the wild offers anything new from this respect. 
Bicchieri’s interest in norms was originally prompted by the puzzle 
of cooperation. How do we explain the fact that many people—in 
experiments as well as, arguably, in real life—engage in cooperation in 
situations in which it is a dominated strategy? A standard way to tackle 
this question, both in the philosophical and in the scientific literature, 
has been to tinker with individual payoffs. The idea is that people may 
be motivated by factors that go beyond the narrow selfish preferences 
of standard economic models. Bicchieri’s original twist has been to 
ignore people’s moral concerns—their taste for equality, for example, 
their altruism, or their desire to reciprocate ‘nice’ and ‘nasty’ actions—
and to focus instead on social norms. A norm is essentially a shared 
preference to follow a behavioural rule, conditional on the fact that 
other people follow that rule and expect others to do it. Her 1993 
definition goes like this: 
 
Let R be a behavioural regularity in population P. Then more 
generally, R is a social norm iff R depends on the beliefs and 
preferences of the members of P in the following way: 
(1) Almost every member of P prefers to conform to R on the 
condition (and only on the condition) that almost everyone 
else conforms, too. 
(2) Almost every member of P believes that almost every other 
member of P conforms to R (p. 232). 
 
Bicchieri’s idea was developed further in her second, very successful 
monograph, The grammar of society (2006). The Grammar not only 
contained a richer theoretical account of social norms, but also backed 
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it up with a wealth of evidence drawn from social psychology, 
experimental and behavioural economics (see Guala 2007).  
In the Grammar we find the following, more sophisticated account: 
 
R is a social norm in a population P if there exists a sufficiently large 
subset of P such that, for each individual belonging to this subset: 
(1) i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations of type S; 
(2) i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S on the 
condition that: 
(a) i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P conforms to R 
in situations of type S, and either 
(b) i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P expects i to 
conform to R in situations of type S, or 
(b') i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P expects i to 
conform to R in situations of type S, prefers i to conform, 
and may sanction behaviour (from Bicchieri 2006, p. 11, 
with a few slight modifications to simplify the notation). 
 
Condition 2(a) is called “Empirical expectations”, while 2(b) is 
“Normative expectations” and 2(b’) is “Normative expectations with 
sanctions”. These requirements distinguish Bicchieri’s theory of norms 
from every significant account proposed earlier, making individual 
preferences conditional on a set of connected beliefs or expectations. 1 A 
distinctive feature of the 1993 formulation is that the beliefs in 2 are 
second-order empirical expectations. At first sight, the formal definition 
proposed in the Grammar seems to replicate this approach, except that 
in 2(b’) the beliefs are backed up by sanctions. A couple of pages later, 
however, Bicchieri asks:  
 
What sort of belief is this? On the one hand, it might just be an 
empirical belief. If I have consistently followed R in situations of 
type S in the past, people may reasonably infer that, ceteris paribus, I 
will do the same in the future, and that is what I believe. On the 
other hand, it might be a normative belief: I believe a sufficiently 
                                                
1 Regarding 2(a), I still think it is odd to say that John’s preference to conform is 
conditional on his belief that others conform: unless John is an idealist philosopher, 
surely, he is more concerned about what Jane will do, than about his own belief about 
what Jane will do. Of course, John’s action—his decision to conform or not—will 
depend on his beliefs about Jane’s behaviour. But his preference, rationally, should not 
(see Guala 2007). 
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large number of people think that I have an obligation to conform to 
R in the appropriate circumstances (2006, p. 15). 
 
This annotation changes the nature of the theory significantly: while 
her earlier account attempted to analyse social norms in terms of 
concepts that did not include any normative element, Bicchieri’s 2006 
account allows norms or normative terms to appear on both sides of the 
equation. Normative expectations are not second-order empirical beliefs 
anymore. There may be an explicit ‘ought’ in condition 2(b), which is not 
further analysed. 
The normative character of expectations is further emphasised in 
Norms in the wild, and made more explicit. Here is Bicchieri’s new 
definition of social norm: 
 
A social norm is a rule of behaviour such that individuals prefer to 
conform to it on condition that they believe that (a) most people in 
their reference network conform to it (empirical expectation) and (b) 
that most people in their reference network believe they ought to 
conform to it (normative expectation) (p. 35, italics in original). 
 
Another way to put it is to say that Rationality and coordination 
offered a reductive account of social norms, while The grammar of 
society and (more explicitly) Norms in the wild do not. The non-reductive 
account is not circular—norms are not analysed in terms of norms, but 
rather in terms of individual normative beliefs. Nonetheless, the notion 
of normative belief is not explained further. One possibility is to say 
that a normative expectation is simply an empirical expectation 
augmented by a propensity to punish deviant behaviour (along the lines 
of condition 2(b’) in the Grammar). Another solution is to say that 
normative expectations are constituted by various propensities that may 
include, say, mental representations (the propensity to represent future 
behaviours), verbal reactions (the propensity to praise or reproach), 
emotions (the propensity to be surprised or annoyed), and so on. In 
other words, the sort of ‘reactive attitudes’, à la Strawson, that we use 
on a daily basis to regulate each other’s behaviour. 
Following the latter approach would make Bicchieri’s theory rather 
similar to its main current rival, the account of norms as clusters of 
normative attitudes proposed by Geoffrey Brennan et al. (2010). Brennan 
and co-authors explicitly offer a non-reductive account, and defend it 
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using various ingenious arguments (aimed in particular at Bicchieri’s 
theory). Although I am not convinced by some of these arguments, I 
wonder whether Bicchieri has anything to say about them. It is a pity 
that alternative accounts of norms are not discussed in Norms in the 
wild—or, as far as I know, anywhere else in Bicchieri’s writings. 
Another issue that remains unexplored is the motivational basis of 
norm compliance. When beliefs are backed up by the threat of sanctions 
(condition 2(b’) in the Grammar), the instrumental motive to comply is 
pretty obvious. But what about condition 2(b), or condition (b) in Norms 
in the wild? Why should I be motivated to do something, merely because 
someone believes that I ought to do it? 
One suggestion is that we might have an innate propensity to care 
about other people’s expectations.2 Our failure to comply with norms 
and conventions is a potential source of unpredictability, and being 
unpredictable hinders one’s capacity to engage in cooperative tasks. 
This, in turn, may reduce one’s fitness. So, it would not be surprising, 
from an evolutionary psychology perspective, if we were endowed with a 
propensity to fulfil others’ expectations. But then we should also expect 
people to use a variety of ways to make such expectations salient by 
means of reproach, punishment, and the like. Bicchieri seems to follow 
this line of reasoning: 
 
the social pressure to conform, expressed in the social expectation 
that one ought to conform, is a powerful motivator. […] If others 
believe one ought to conform, the reaction to non conformity may 
range from slight displeasure to active or even extreme punishment 
(2017, pp. 34-35, italics in original). 
 
But again, we are spared the details, and the causes of our 
motivation to fulfil others’ expectations remain largely opaque. 
 
II. MEASURING NORMS 
A good deal of chapter two (“Measuring norms”) is devoted to 
illustrating experimental and non-experimental techniques to detect and 
quantify the impact of social norms. Bicchieri has been actively engaged 
in this research, designing and running laboratory experiments with 
various collaborators during the last decade. Laboratory experiments, 
however, are very useful to test causal hypotheses, less so for policy-
                                                
2 See, e.g., Sugden (1998, 2000). Similar considerations support Brennan and Pettit’s 
(2004) theory of esteem. 
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making. Because Norms in the wild is particularly focused on field 
intervention, Bicchieri spends a great deal of time illustrating alternative 
techniques for the measurement of social norms—like surveys, 
questionnaires, and vignettes.  
The limitations of these methods are well-known: they are not 
incentivized, they do not involve the direct manipulation of key 
variables, and they do not allow the observation of people’s real choices. 
Still, verbal reports help researchers to elicit peoples’ conscious beliefs 
about others’ expectations. 
Many techniques illustrated by Bicchieri are based on direct 
questions about ‘what would happen if’ someone in the community did 
this or that, or on the visual presentation of little stories in which 
fictional but realistic characters engage in behaviours that may be 
considered problematic from a normative point of view. The fact that 
such stories are couched in familiar contexts and scenarios is clearly an 
advantage compared to the anodyne choice situations of many 
laboratory experiments. Among other things, they facilitate the 
emergence of plausible responses from our largely subconscious 
behavioural repertoire. Counterfactual scenarios help individual 
responders to make explicit the content of rules, and the attitudes that 
others may have with respect to such rules. An important point is that 
observation and manipulation are mingled here, because the elicitation 
of beliefs often constitutes the first step of the policy intervention: 
thinking about norms is one of the conditions that make social change 
possible.  
 
III. A DUAL ACCOUNT 
In the Grammar and in Norms in the wild, Bicchieri is careful to say that 
her expectation-dependent model of norms is not supposed to give a 
literal description of the psychological processes that govern norm 
compliance in ordinary situations. If you see people queuing in front of 
a desk, you usually do not begin to ponder: ‘What do these people 
expect me to do?’, or ‘What would their reaction be if I cut in front of 
the line?’. In most ordinary cases, you simply apply automatically the 
rules that apply in the circumstances. Your actions are governed by 
‘scripts’: 
 
Scripts are essentially prescriptive sequences of actions of varying 
levels of specificity that people automatically engage in (and are 
expected to engage in) while in particular situations (p. 132).  
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This account of rule-following is intuitively correct. It is consistent 
not only with the phenomenology of ordinary action, but also with the 
bounded rationality, heuristics, and dual-system theories that have 
come to dominate the cognitive and behavioural sciences over the last 
thirty years. The interesting issue is what relationship there may be 
between automatic script-guided behaviour, on the one hand, and the 
expectation-dependent preferences that are at the core of Bicchieri’s 
definition of norms, on the other. 
Bicchieri’s writing tends to become metaphorical at this point: 
 
Norms are embedded into scripts because scripts contain empirical 
and normative expectations, and violations of scripts typically elicit 
negative emotions and remedial actions (p. 132). 
 
We have beliefs and can refer to them when we want to, but the 
majority of the time they stay dormant—exerting unconscious 
influence on our behaviour up until the point when their validity is 
challenged (p. 128). 
 
How does a script “contain” expectations, exactly? What does it 
mean that a belief remains “dormant”? How can it “exert unconscious 
influence on our behaviour”? These metaphors unfortunately do not 
contribute much to our understanding of norm-abiding behaviour. 
In light of the evidence surveyed by Bicchieri, it seems more 
appropriate to admit that expectations play a minor role in ordinary 
cases of compliance with social norms. Scripts, heuristics, cue-driven 
automatic behaviour probably do all of the job that needs to be done. 
But this then means that there are two accounts of norm-following in 
Bicchieri’s theory—one for ‘ordinary’ and one for ‘extraordinary’ 
situations, so to speak. This is an important point that Bicchieri does 
not emphasise enough, in my view. It is important because it brings her 
theory in line with recent developments in the philosophy of mind, and 
because it shows in which sense it may provide a rational-choice 
explanation of norm-driven behaviour. 
What picture of the mind is implicit in Bicchieri’s theory? Her 
definition of norms is essentially game-theoretic, and standard game 
theory moves from the assumption that behaviour is determined by 
individual beliefs and desires (or preferences). Moreover, it presupposes 
that people are able to form beliefs about other people’s beliefs and 
desires. People are belief-desire mind readers. 
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A substantial body of research, however, has recently questioned the 
belief-desire model of mind reading that economists and philosophers 
cherish. This body of research points out that belief-desire attributions 
are used only rarely to predict and explain other people’s behaviour. In 
fact, they seem to be used mainly in anomalous circumstances—that is, 
when other techniques of interpretation fail.3 
Suppose you are sitting in the waiting room of a public office, with a 
‘no-smoking’ sign hanging on the wall in front of you. The main reason 
why you don’t pull out a cigarette, probably, is that the sign says so. You 
don’t need to think about what other people in the room might possibly 
think if you smoked. But if a lady is lighting a cigarette, you begin to 
speculate about her beliefs, and about the expectations of by-standers 
(you try to meet their gaze, trying to detect cues of their normative 
attitudes). As Bicchieri points out, “we often become consciously aware 
of our beliefs the moment something unexpected happens and those 
beliefs are challenged” (p. 128). 
The story Bicchieri is offering therefore is a dual account of the 
psychology of social norms. Norm-following on the one hand, and norm-
enforcing and norm-transgressing on the other, are likely to be governed 
by distinct mechanisms.4 But her rational choice definition of norms is 
able to capture only half of the story. 
One may argue that rational choice models are explanatory even 
when the causal factors they mention (normative expectations, in this 
case) are not activated. Philip Pettit (1995), for example, has argued that 
rational choice models can explain the resilience, as opposed to the 
continuation of behaviour. Explanations of resilience tell us why a 
certain pattern does not change, or would not change, in spite of 
changes in the circumstances. Thus, given a certain structure of 
incentives and beliefs, people may follow a norm without thinking about 
those incentives and beliefs at all (continuation). But the important point 
is that, were the situation to become anomalous, the mechanisms 
mentioned by Bicchieri (expectation-dependent preferences) would bring 
the behaviour back in line with the content of the norm (resilience). This 
                                                
3 The origins of this idea can be found in Bruner (1990) and have been developed in 
various directions in the following literature. See, for example, McGeer (2007) and 
Hutto (2008).  
4 To put it concisely, using the standard two-systems terminology (e.g., Kahneman 
2011): norm-following is mostly system 1, while norm change, enforcement, and 
perhaps also transgression engage (mostly) system 2. Pluralist accounts of mind-
reading are defended by Andrews (2012) and Fiebich and Coltheart (2015), for 
example. 
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would reconcile Bicchieri’s formal definition of norms with the dual 
account that she outlines informally. 
 
IV. REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING 
At this point, it is important to recall what the ultimate goal of 
Bicchieri’s theorizing is. Because her fundamental interest is 
intervention, norm-enforcement and norm-evasion are salient in her 
discussion. And because expectations are crucial both to enforce and to 
change existing norms, the theory places expectations at centre stage. 
But if the question is what norms are, and how they influence behaviour, 
the complete answer must go along these lines: they are rules mapping 
behavioural responses onto stereotypical situations, that are 
automatically triggered and followed in ordinary circumstances (for 
example, when everyone complies); that activate the reactive attitudes of 
others when they are violated occasionally, and a thorough examination 
of other people’s empirical and normative beliefs when they are 
systematically or collectively breached by several people. In the latter 
two cases, our preference for compliance is truly conditional on 
expectations, that is, we deliberately modulate our behaviour according 
to others’ psychological and behavioural dispositions. Otherwise, 
expectations do not play a direct causal role in norm-compliance. 
There is a sense in which Norms in the wild may be read as a 
guidebook for the creation of anomalous situations, that is, situations in 
which people stop following rules in an automatic manner, and begin 
instead to think critically about the attitudes that other people have—or 
ought to have—about those rules. Social workers, health practitioners, 
political activists and leaders can play a crucial role in this process that 
through exposure, recognition, questioning, and collective discussion 
may lead eventually to the replacement of harmful norms with 
beneficial ones. Bicchieri’s definition of norms, the measurement 
techniques that she illustrates, and the policy interventions they prepare 
the ground for, are different parts of one and the same package. To 
paraphrase Ian Hacking (1983), Bicchieri’s theory is not only (perhaps 
not mainly) for representing, but also (perhaps especially) for 
intervening. 
This is what makes Norms in the wild interesting and different from 
most books in the philosophy of social science. While reading it, you will 
learn about the importance of convincing mothers-in-law that feeding 
colostrum does not harm babies; you will learn how to use flies to 
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demonstrate that open defecation leads to food poisoning; you will learn 
why soap operas emancipate women; you will learn what characteristics 
an individual must have to become a trendsetter; and many other 
fascinating tricks to manipulate the norms that govern our behaviour. 
Bicchieri must be commended for trying to turn a theoretical insight 
into a toolbox for policy making. If you are tired of philosophers’ 
unlikely thought experiments, if you are fed up with the pursuit of 
conceptual analysis for its own sake, or if you are worried that social 
ontology and the philosophy of social science may have no practical 
implications, then there is no better reading than this. 
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